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A B S T R A C T
Private forests are widespread in Europe providing a range of ecosystem services of signiﬁcant value to society,
and there are calls for novel policies to enhance their provision and to face the challenges of environmental
changes. Such policies need to acknowledge the importance of private forests, and importantly they need to be
based on a deep understanding of how property rights held by private forest owners vary across Europe. We
collected and analysed data on the content of property rights based on formal legal requirements existing in 31
European jurisdictions. To allow a comparison across jurisdictions, we constructed an original Property Rights
Index for Forestry encompassing ﬁve rights domains (access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and aliena-
tion). We documented substantial variation of the private forest owners’ rights, and notably to i) make decisions
in operational management and the formulation of management goals, ii) withdraw timber resources from their
forest, and iii) exclude others from the use of forest resources. We identiﬁed broad relations between the scope
for decision making of private forest owners and jurisdictions’ former socio-political background and geo-
graphical distribution. The variation in the content of property rights has implications for the implementation of
international environmental policies, and stresses the need for tailored policy instruments, when addressing
European society’s rural development, the bioeconomy, climate change mitigation measures and nature pro-
tection strategies.
1. Introduction
Forests account for 32.2% of the European territory (FOREST
EUROPE, 2015), providing important environmental services and eco-
nomic beneﬁts (Mori et al., 2016). Currently, nearly half of European
forests are privately owned (Schmithüsen and Hirsch, 2010). Con-
temporary policy on private forest management is guided by sustain-
able forest management concepts (Fares et al., 2015). Depending on the
region and forest type, these emphasise diﬀerent aspects of sustain-
ability, such as “sustainable yield” which focuses on sustained timber
production, “multi-purpose forestry” which highlights multiple goods
and services, or “ecosystem management” which stresses the status and
evolution of forest ecosystems (Winkel et al., 2009). At the same time,
most European countries are mandated with implementing a plethora
of European Union (EU) legislative and policy instruments (Winkel
et al., 2013).
Nationally or regionally-based regulatory frameworks inﬂuence the
de jure property rights distribution and hence they impact on the eco-
nomic and procedural aspects of forest management (Cubbage et al.,
2007). A system of property rights is based on “the set of economic and
social relations and norms deﬁning the position of each individual with
respect to the utilisation of scarce resources” (Furubotn and Pejovich,
1972) and thus depends on institutional decisions (Kissling-Näf and
Bisang, 2001; Vatn, 2005). The diversity of national, legal, cultural and
historic contexts has led to diﬀerent levels of restrictions on the man-
agement of private forestland, establishing the duties and responsi-
bilities governing forest managers, owners and users (Krott, 2005).
Private forest owners’ (PFOs) property rights determine the scope
for forest owners to decide individually on the delivery of forest goods
and services to the society, subject to the rationale and eﬃcacy of the
legal implementation of policies that are related to forests (Bouriaud
and Schmithüsen, 2005). These decisions inﬂuence the balance that is
struck between commercial ecosystem services, like timber, on one
hand and non-commercial ecosystem services, such as biodiversity
conservation, on the other hand (Lockie, 2013). Hence, a structure of
property rights has the potential to inﬂuence the entrepreneurial ac-
tivities of forest owners (Buttoud et al., 2011), the implementation of
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies (Lindner et al.,
2010), the implementation of nature conservation policies (Winkel
et al., 2015) and the delivery of forests products to renewable energy
markets (Bouriaud et al., 2014; Kleinschmit et al., 2014; Stupak et al.,
2007).
An analysis of property rights based on legal entitlements (Bromley,
1997) is less informative than an approach that considers the bundles of
rights (Galik and Jagger, 2015) that are associated with the use of
forests. The constitutional setting of the private form of ownership is
based on the legal entitlements conferred on a PFO and does not deﬁne
per se the bundle of rights which determines the scope for decision
making and the execution of activities a PFO may wish to perform.
Despite its obvious importance, there is an absence of comparative
studies investigating across multiple countries the links between prop-
erty rights distributions and their oﬃcial regulations relating to sus-
tainable forest management. Existing studies of forest ownership at the
European level focus on the overall assessment of forms of ownership
(Schmithüsen and Hirsch, 2010) and changes in ownership structure
(Živojinović et al., 2015), while studies into the distribution of rights
have a primarily regional focus (Avdibegovic et al., 2010; Bouriaud
et al., 2013; Glück et al., 2010).
To address this issue, we designed an index of property rights dis-
tribution in forestry (PRIF), to provide a structured comparative over-
view of the impacts of multiple regulatory frameworks on the property
rights of PFOs. The PRIF is conceptually based on Schlager and
Ostrom’s (1992) analytical framework of property rights distribution,
which we interpret in the context of private forest ownership. A similar
framework is used by the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) to assess
the impact of national laws that relate to the forest tenure rights of
indigenous people and communities in Latin America, Asia and Africa
(RRI, 2012). In the RRI study, the unit used to analyse the distribution
of the bundle of rights is the community, while our focus is on private
forests belonging to individual owners.
The construction of the PRIF is grounded on a systematic and
transparent approach required for the formation of indices (Dobbie and
Dail, 2013; Voigt, 2013). The use of composite indices is becoming
increasingly popular in the assessment of sustainable development de-
terminants (Rogge, 2012) such as economic systems, e.g. the Index of
Economic Freedom (Miller et al., 2015), social fulﬁlment, e.g. the
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016) and environmental perfor-
mances, e.g. the Environmental Performance Index (Hsu et al., 2016).
Many indices are intended to estimate sectoral policy diversity across
jurisdictions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016; Hsu et al., 2016; Levy-
Carciente, 2016), yet there is no speciﬁc index designed for the as-
sessment of forest property rights. The International Property Rights
Index (Levy-Carciente, 2016) has a broader scope than the PRIF, ser-
ving as a barometer of the security of property rights across the world,
and does not speciﬁcally target the management of natural resources.
The paper introduces the methods used for setting the PRIF, displays
the calculated values in a European scale analysis and identiﬁes re-
gional patterns of the distribution of rights. As with other composite
indices, the PRIF can be used in benchmarking comparisons, the eva-
luation of the evolution of policies or a tool for more eﬀective stake-
holder and public communication (das Neves Almeida and García-
Sánchez, 2016; Zhou et al., 2006).
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2. Methods
2.1. The conceptual framework
The framework of Schlager and Ostrom (1992) has the advantage of
transforming a rather abstract understanding of a property rights
system into a set of ﬁve property rights categories (PRC), which con-
stituted the bundle of rights that were associated with forest attributes
that have value to the owner. These PRCs are: 1) access rights (the right
of owners to enter their forest land), 2) withdrawal rights (the right to
harvest or remove timber, ﬁrewood and non-wood forest products –
NWFPs), 3) management rights (the right to plan internal forest activ-
ities and transform the forest), 4) exclusion rights (legal prescriptions to
prevent access and harvesting of wood and NWFPs by external users),
5) alienation rights (the right to sell forestland and forest products).
The index is based on de jure applications of property rights. We
speciﬁcally analysed the formal legal rules (North, 1990) which inﬂu-
ence the PFO’s scope for decision making. Only laws and policies per-
taining to “normal productive forests” were screened. No scenarios
were included for forests in protected areas (e.g. Natura 2000 sites) or
forests that were subject to plant health or quarantine measures. The
level of restriction (vis-à-vis the degree of freedom) in each jurisdiction
was assigned using expert analyses of legislation and policy that di-
rectly aﬀect PFOs’ abilities to beneﬁt from the forest amenities provided
by their own forest property. The level of restriction is grounded in the
rules of law applying to private forests, and does not assess perceptions
of de facto situations in implementing these rules.
2.2. The selection of indicators
The selection of indicators was done during three expert meetings
that took place in 2013–2014 under the auspices of the FP 1201 FAC-
ESMAP COST Action which dealt with forest ownership changes across
30 European countries (Živojinović et al., 2015). In this context, an
initial core group of scientiﬁc and professional experts from 18 coun-
tries was created, with regular participation in working group meetings.
They are considered national experts based on the selection procedures
of the COST Action, while their scientiﬁc backgrounds are relevant to
this speciﬁc ﬁeld of study. Given the systematic and extensive metho-
dological development of the PRIF involving a broad spectrum of ex-
pertise across Europe, the selection of indicators covered the practical
possibilities that may arise in the day to day interaction of a PFO with
their forest property. It also minimizes any possible bias in focus arising
from diﬀerent systems of law across Europe (Legrand, 1999).
Based in the conceptual framework, a total of 37 indicators were
identiﬁed to cover the entire range of possible restrictions across the
ﬁve PRCs (Supplementary material Table S1). The indicators are further
grouped into 10 sub-categories of rights to closer reﬂect the forest
ecosystem services they refer to: access rights, withdrawal rights for
timber, withdrawal rights for NWFPs, rights for land use change, rights
for management planning, rights for operational management, exclu-
sion of public access, exclusion for the use of NWFPs, alienation rights
for forest land and alienation rights for timber.
2.3. Data collection
The selected indicators were then incorporated into a multiple
choice questionnaire designed for the national experts in forest policy
analysis to respond to. Each indicator is formulated as a speciﬁc ques-
tion (e.g. is the forest owner allowed to enter the forest, to collect
mushrooms, to decide on the species to be planted, to sell the forestland
etc). By deﬁning the indicators as speciﬁc questions centred on legal
provisions regulating owners’ actions, the role of the expert respondents
was to provide an evaluation of each indicator as addressed de jure in
the forest regulatory framework. In order to assure the consistency of
interpretation of legal provisions, each indicator is allocated with a
predeﬁned category, identiﬁed in a deductive process by the core group
of experts. A comment box for each indicator was also included in the
questionnaire to cater for particular situations that may arise within a
participant’s jurisdiction, not covered by the initial predeﬁned cate-
gories.
The questionnaire was sent to the national representatives partici-
pating in the FP 1201 FACESMAP COST Action. Inputs from 27 coun-
tries (out of 30 participating countries) were provided between 2015
and 2016 by the national members of the COST Action. Considering
that the aim of the multi-national comparative analysis is to cover as
many countries as possible at the European level, other experts from
outside the action were contacted to provide answers for the missing
countries. They were selected from academia, based on their out-
standing scientiﬁc contribution in the ﬁeld of forest policy analysis. In
the end, 39 experts covering 31 jurisdictions provided answers on the
status of applicable legislation on the 1st of October 2015. Thus the
description of the rights and the calculation of the PRIF is interpreted as
being valid for this date.
2.4. Data processing
Processing of the initial respondents’ questionnaires (post-hoc ca-
tegorisation) was conducted to ensure that each indicator is covered by
the full range of relevant alternatives, describing the diversity of legal
stipulations identiﬁable across the 31 jurisdictions. For example, if a
particular situation for a jurisdiction was identiﬁed as missing in the
initial list of alternatives, a new alternative was created, based on the
comments recorded in the questionnaires. Similarly, if multiple answers
for any indicator were applicable, intermediate categories were created
describing more precisely the legal provision for the indicator. In many
situations the initial deductive categories have been complemented
with additional ones so that each jurisdiction is represented in a cate-
gory as close as possible to the legal provision. In the case where
multiple answers were applicable for an indicator, the category that
gave the most freedom to the owners was considered in the assessment
(e.g. an owner may be allowed to do the selection of the trees to be
harvested but of course he may also use a professional forester for that).
In a situation when the legal system did not address a certain indicator
at all, the speciﬁc category “not-regulated” was used. An internal va-
lidation of the post-hoc categorisation was carried out by sending the
ﬁnal inputs back to the national experts for a second time.
2.5. Data weighting
The full range of alternatives were sorted out and weighted to
quantify the degree of freedom in decision making. Alternatives for
each indicator were presented in the order of an increasing restriction
on PFOs and were weighted from “no restrictions” (100% degrees of
freedom) to “fully restricted” (0% degrees of freedom) with inter-
mediate levels of restriction being present. Extreme alternative answers
were not found to be present in the legislation (e.g. fully restricting
owners from entering their property) for some indicators but they were
included to facilitate the weighting of the intermediate alternatives. As
the scoring distance between the possible alternative answers could not
be presumed to be linear for all indicators, a weighting of the inter-
mediate categories was carried out based on inputs from an expert
panel. Out of the initial list of 18 core group members, 12 members
provided answers for weighting the categories. The members of the
expert panel came from four diﬀerent backgrounds (forest practitioners,
forest policy analysis, social sciences and juridical sciences) and cov-
ered all the geographical regions identiﬁed by FOREST EUROPE
(2015).
The role of the experts was to compare the degree of freedom in
decision making that a particular indicator may bestow on the PFO in
the context of the other possible alternatives for that indicator, on the
basis of their interpretation of the rigour of legal provisions. When
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scoring the alternatives, experts were provided with 6 background ca-
tegories that set the limits of restrictions: no restrictions apply (100%
freedom); low level of restrictions (75%–99% freedom); moderate level
of restrictions (50%–74% freedom); high level of restrictions (25–49%
freedom); extremely high level of restrictions (1–24% freedom); fully
restricted (0% freedom). The role of the background categories was to
link the qualitative observations derived from the legislation with the
quantitative assessment of the degree of freedom and thus to assure the
consistency among the perceptions of diﬀerent experts. The members of
the panel provided their valuation of alternatives in a double blind
weighting process. At ﬁrst, an individual weight was assigned for each
alternative, and then the experts were asked to validate or adjust the
answers considering the average weight calculated for each alternative.
2.6. The aggregation of the indicators
All indicators were considered to be equally weighted in the index
to allow for comparisons between jurisdictions with diﬀerent forest
policy and regulatory landscapes. The Property Rights Index in Forestry
(PRIF) scores for each jurisdiction was the mean of the values for each
indicator (qi) for the set of 37 indicators (n). The value of the index
ranges from 0 (when full restrictions apply for all the indicators) to 100
(when owners have a full degree of freedom for all the indicators).
∑
= =PRIF
q
n
i
n
i
1
(1)
Each PRC was assessed using a similar method and represents the
mean value of the indicators corresponding to that category. However,
the number of indicators in each of the PRCs reﬂects the inﬂuence each
category has on the overall PRIF value: access rights accounts for 3% in
the PRIF formation, withdrawal rights account for 30%, management
rights account for 35%, exclusion rights account for 19% and alienation
rights account for 13%. Depending on one’s’ relationship with the
forest, viewpoints may diﬀer on the role the various private forests
attributes have in the provision of ecosystem services, and consequently
on the importance of each of the PRCs which may be perceived dif-
ferently among stakeholders in terms of their relative importance. Thus,
an interpretation of the overall PRIF needs to be made in the context of
its constituent PRC’s.
2.7. Comparative analysis of PRIF
We applied the index to a European scale comparison across 31
jurisdictions, covering more than 60 million hectares of forest land in
individual private ownership (Živojinović et al., 2015). The jurisdic-
tions analysed are national or regional, according to the relevant levels
of policymaking. Thus, in 24 cases the legal framework is analysed at
the country level (abbreviations of the countries are identiﬁed using the
ISO 3166), while in seven cases the level of analysis is regional: Wal-
lonia—Belgium (BE-WAL), Baden-Württemberg—Germany (DE-BW),
Bavaria—Germany (DE-BY), Veneto—Italy (IT-34), Catalonia—Spain
(ES-CT), Aargau—Switzerland (CH-AG) and Scotland—Great Britain
(GB-SCT).
In order to compare the distribution of rights among the jurisdic-
tions, a principal component analysis was used as an exploratory data
analysis, considering the 10 sub-categories of rights as variables and the
31 jurisdictions as observations. The aim of the component analysis was
to identify the patterns of regional diﬀerentiation of jurisdictions re-
sulting from the interactions between the PRCs. The FactoMineR
package (Lê et al., 2008) of R (version 3.01) was used.
3. Results
3.1. Distribution of access rights
Access rights into forests was assessed based on one indicator,
questioning if the owners are free to enter their own property. This right
is generally fully permitted to the owners in 17 out of 31 jurisdictions,
which are scored with full freedom for owners (100%). Some temporary
restrictions may apply for health and safety reasons, prevention of ﬁres
or military purposes in 12 jurisdictions (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Catalonia, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, FYR Macedonia,
Lithuania, Serbia, Slovakia, Scotland and Sweden). These restrictions
are assessed as giving 90% degrees of freedom to owners since they
apply in rare circumstances. Consequently, there are no big disparities
in access rights between the jurisdictions analysed, except two cases. In
Romania, access restrictions for owners may be imposed under a fra-
mework of contractual agreements to prevent illegal logging. Since the
owner may choose to decline these restrictions the degree of freedom
attained is still high (80%). Legally imposed restrictions are identiﬁed
in Wallonia during designated hunting days where access to the forest
by PFOs is restricted thus Wallonia attains a moderately restrictive
score (55% degrees of freedom) in this category.
3.2. Distribution of withdrawal rights
State involvement in determining or supervising the PFOs with re-
gard to what or how much they are permitted to harvest from their
forest was assessed based on 6 indicators that make reference to timber
products (Table 1) and 5 indicators that make reference to NWFPs
(Table 2).
In 13 out of the 31 jurisdictions the amount of timber that may be
harvested can be decided by the forest owner, with restrictions imposed
on exceptional cases or in a framework of general technical provisions
(Table 1a). At the other extreme, in nine countries owners cannot de-
cide on the amount of timber to be harvested, this being set by the
provisions of a mandatory management plan. In the remaining nine
jurisdictions the amount that can be harvested with owner’s self-control
is provided for as a quantitative threshold in the relevant legislation. In
France and Veneto region (Italy) more detailed regulations are in place
that combine the size of the forest and harvesting rates. At the time of
the assessment, only Lithuanian law distinguished between the har-
vesting of timber for “personal” and “commercial” uses.
In most of the jurisdictions forest owners are required to inform
authorities or get their approval before harvesting commences. Even in
this respect important diﬀerences exist from the need to inform au-
thorities only when they planned to commence harvesting in special
cases to the need to ask for approval in any situation (Table 1b). In
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and FYR Macedonia the collection of fallen
branches from the ground and harvesting of standing timber is treated
similarly with regard to regulatory requirements, while in the re-
maining 27 jurisdictions brushwood collection is at owners’ discretion.
Regarding the freedom to physically harvest trees (Table 1c) it is ob-
served that in 24 out of the 31 jurisdictions the owner has the right to
harvest the trees themselves. In Romania this is possible only for
quantities bellow 20m3, while in ﬁve other jurisdictions this is possible
if the owner has a special licence. Only in Greece, the owner is always
obliged to contract a specialised ﬁrm for harvesting operations.
For NWFPs there are fewer legal prescriptions compared to timber
withdrawal (Table 2). Harvesting rights for the private use of mush-
rooms (an example of a product comparable across jurisdictions) are
generally granted to the owner in 27 out of the 31 jurisdictions
(Table 2a). Only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and
Slovenia are there maximum quantity limits imposed. Rules for the
commercial uses of mushrooms do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, only in eight
countries are speciﬁc certiﬁcates approvals required if the owner wants
to sell the mushrooms (Table 2b).
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Game for hunting is not owned by the PFOs in any of the countries
analysed and thus the assessment considers a highly restrictive scope
for decision making exists with respect to the legal provisions per-
taining hunting activities in all jurisdictions. Diﬀerences exist in the
formulation of the legal provisions which is shown by the fact that in 15
out of the 31 jurisdictions the game belongs to nobody (res nullius) and
in 14 jurisdictions to the state, which has the right to transfer the
ownership of said game. In only two jurisdictions the game legally
belongs to a hunting association (Wallonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Regarding the decision on the amount of game to be hunted (Table 2c),
in 19 out of the 31 jurisdictions the owner cannot inﬂuence the hunting
quota, this being decided by hunting associations and approved by a
state authority. Only in Denmark can the owner decide on the hunting
quota without any form of approval. In the remaining 11 jurisdictions,
various diﬀerent legal scenarios exist given a diﬀerent scope for deci-
sion making to the PFOs.
Grazing may impact forest regeneration and thus this activity is
regulated in most European jurisdictions, with the exception of ﬁve
countries where no speciﬁc regulations exist (Table 2d). In 15 out of the
31 jurisdictions grazing activities are legally forbidden or permitted
only in special conditions, while in the remaining 11 jurisdictions, the
owners can decide on how or if grazing activities can take place in their
forests.
With relation to the 11 indicators evaluated under the withdrawal
rights category, substantial diﬀerences between the jurisdictions are
identiﬁed, the withdrawal rights index ranging from 27 degrees of
freedom in Greece to 84 degrees of freedom in Denmark (Fig. 1), with
an average of 61 degrees of freedom and a standard deviation of 16.8
(Table 6).
3.3. Distribution of management rights
The right to plan and transform the forest has been assessed based
on 13 indicators divided in 3 subcategories: rights for land use change
(3 indicators), rights for management planning (8 indicators) and rights
for implementing forest management operations (2 indicators).
In all jurisdictions, there are restrictions imposed on forestland
management particularly regarding land use change, e.g. a change from
forest use to an agricultural or other land use (Table 3a). Forest land use
change is permitted in 22 out of the 31 jurisdictions, but PFOs have to
undergo some procedural steps or are allowed to change only a limited
area. In Catalonia, forest use change is only permitted for agricultural
purposes subject to a ploughing authorisation, but any land use change
is forbidden in burnt forests all over Spain for a period of at least 30
years. On the contrary, PFOs in nine jurisdictions are not allowed to
change the forest land use except in cases relating to the public interest.
Rules on forest regeneration oblige PFOs to reforest the land after ﬁnal
felling in all cases except Wallonia, Portugal and Catalonia. However,
two contrasting approaches exist here: in 12 of the 31 jurisdictions,
reforestation can be subsidised or be subject to grant applications while
in 15 jurisdictions owners have no or few opportunities to access ﬁ-
nancial support for reforestation.
Many diﬀerences between jurisdictions exist with regard to the
regulation of the forest management planning and the subsequent
treatment of timber harvesting. Forest Management Plans (FMPs) are
not compulsory in 12 out of the 31 jurisdictions (Table 3b), but can be
required for speciﬁc situations (e.g. qualiﬁcation for ﬁnancial subsidies
in Austria and Scotland, “a plan of works” in Ireland and in case of
clear-cuts over 5 ha in Wallonia). In nine other jurisdictions, a FMP is
Fig. 1. Geographical distribution of withdrawal rights across the analysed jurisdictions. The ﬁgure is compiled from the data we collected for 11 indicators. Each indicator was
assessed on a scale ranging from 0 (“right fully restricted”) to 100 (“no restrictions apply”). The withdrawal rights index is the mean value of the 11 indicators. The gradient of the colour
varies from a lighter colour (low degree of freedom in decision making) to darker colours (high degree of freedom in decision making).
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required only if the size of property is above a certain area. On the
contrary, in six former-socialist countries, an FMP is always required,
regardless of the size of the property and regardless of the forestry
works the owner intends to carry out.
Large disparities also exist between countries in the area of FMP
formulation (Table 3c). Whereas PFOs were free to choose the man-
agement goals in six out of the 31 jurisdictions, the forest owners’ in-
terests were not considered at all in the planning procedures in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia. Beyond these two contrasting situa-
tions, forest owners’ participation in the deﬁnition of FMP goals varied
from an active involvement in setting the management goals within the
limits of the law (in 13 jurisdictions) to a formal consultation with
limited possibilities of inﬂuencing the forest management goals (in nine
jurisdictions). Forest policies give priority to timber production in six
countries where timber production cannot be abandoned as the main
management goal (Austria, FYR Macedonia, Hungary and Poland) or
has to be kept at a level deﬁned as “suﬃcient” by the legislation
(Sweden and Aargau- Switzerland).
Private forest owners can directly manage their own forests in 19
out of the 31 jurisdictions. However, in the former socialist countries
(except the Baltic countries) the state requires that the implementation
of management activities in private forests are executed by profes-
sionals, employed by the owner (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Czech Republic), compensated by the authority without costs
to the owner (Croatia, Slovenia, Poland and in Czech Republic for
owners without FMP) or imposed by the authority at the owners’ cost
(Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia). These variations are
reﬂected in operational management issues such as who is entitled to
select the trees for harvesting (Table 3d) and to decide on the type of
species to be used for reforestation (Table 3e).
The 13 indicators that constitute the management PRC, point to
substantial diﬀerences across the jurisdictions with respect to the reg-
ulation of private forest management. The values of the management
rights index vary from 12 degrees of freedom in FYR Macedonia to 84
degrees of freedom in Bavaria in Germany (Fig. 2), with an average of
54 degrees of freedom and a standard deviation of 23.6 (Table 6). Here
former socialist countries form a compact group with high levels of
restriction while forest owners from Western and Nordic countries
generally have more freedom to decide on operational matters (Fig. 2).
3.4. Distribution of exclusion rights
The regulation of exclusion rights concerns the forest owners’ legal
ability to allow or prevent the general public or other public forest user
categories from entering and beneﬁting from the forest resource
(Table 4).
In 16 out of 31 jurisdictions public access into private forests cannot
be restricted, with some exceptions in speciﬁc situations. In four
countries access has to be allowed only on designated pathways
(Table 4a). In contrast, only nine jurisdictions permit public access into
the forest to be legally restricted. Camping in forests can be restricted
by the owner in 20 jurisdictions while in only four cases, camping was
considered an “everyman’s right” (Table 4b). In Greece and FYR Ma-
cedonia public access into the forest and the right to restrict camping is
not regulated.
Regarding the more tangible assets such as non-wood products,
there were fewer legal restrictions in comparison to timber products:
mushroom picking for recreational purposes can be restricted in 16
jurisdictions, while in ﬁve jurisdictions, restrictions on the quantity of
mushrooms that can be harvested are provided for in the legislation
Fig. 2. Geographical distribution of management rights across the analysed jurisdictions. The ﬁgure is compiled from the data we collected for 13 indicators characterizing
management rights. Each indicator was assessed on a scale ranging from 0 (“right fully restricted”) to 100 (“no restrictions apply”). The management rights index is the mean value of the
13 indicators. The gradient of the colour varies from a lighter colour (low degree of freedom in decision making) to darker colours (high degree of freedom in decision making).
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(Table 4c). In contrast, in 10 other jurisdictions the owner cannot re-
strict the collection of mushrooms for recreational purposes. Regarding
the harvesting of mushrooms for commercial purposes, in 24 jurisdic-
tions owners had the right to restrict commercial mushroom harvesting.
In only four countries this activity remains an “everyman’s right”
(Finland, Norway, Sweden and Greece). With regard to hunting activ-
ities (Table 4d), in nine out of 31 jurisdictions the owner can decide if
and who is allowed to hunt on their property regardless of the size of
the forest, while in 11 jurisdictions the owners can decide, subject to a
minimum forest size threshold. On the contrary 11 jurisdictions require
the owner to accept hunting activities taking place on their forestland,
either with or without ﬁnancial compensation.
The degrees of freedom for the seven indicators that characterise the
exclusion rights vary between 24 degrees of freedom in SI to 96 degrees
of freedom in FR (Fig. 3), with an average of 59 degrees of freedom and
a standard deviation of 20.4 across the analysed jurisdictions (Table 6).
The exclusion rights did not produce any clear pattern of geographical
distribution (Fig. 3).
3.5. Distribution of alienation rights
In all jurisdictions, the owner has the right to sell forest land and
forest products. Nevertheless, full alienation rights for forest land are
permissible in only nine jurisdictions (Table 5). The right to sell could
be altered in 13 jurisdictions by a pre-emption right in favour of the
state or in favour of neighbours while in four other jurisdictions a no-
tiﬁcation to the authority is required which may restrict the selling in
special conditions. Uniquely in FYR Macedonia, the state always pur-
chases the land so the owners cannot decide on the purchaser.
In all jurisdictions, there are no restrictions imposed on the owners
in setting the price for forest land or the price for timber. Only in
Finland there are some restrictions that can apply to the methods for
timber selling. Hence, the distribution of alienation rights is quite
uniformly distributed across the jurisdictions. The average degree of
freedom for alienation rights is 91 and the standard deviation is 7
(Table 6).
3.6. Property rights index in forestry (PRIF)
The PRIF and the ﬁve PRCs facilitates the comparative analysis of
the distribution of property rights across jurisdictions. An overview of
regulatory frameworks across the 31 European jurisdictions, as quan-
tiﬁed by the PRIF, shows a clear variation in the PFO’s scope for de-
cision making relating to their forests and their interaction with same.
PRIF values ranged from 38.4 in FYR Macedonia to 84.7 in the
Netherlands (Fig. 4), with a mean of 63 degrees of freedom and a
standard deviation of 15 degrees of freedom (Table 6).
Access and alienation rights are only restricted in exceptional cases.
The combination of withdrawal, management and exclusion rights
makes for a very diverse policy landscape across the European jur-
isdictions (Fig. 5). The jurisdictions with the highest PRIF (the Neth-
erlands, Denmark, Wallonia) have attained high degrees of freedom for
all ﬁve PRCs. Even though they score high degrees of freedom in the
withdrawal and management PRCs, the Nordic countries (Finland,
Norway, Sweden) do not achieve PRIFs as high as the aforementioned
due to the lower scores achieved for the exclusion PRC given the “ev-
eryman’s right” rule regarding the public access and harvesting of
NWFP’s.
In order to identify the components of the index that explained most
of the variation that exists between jurisdictions’ PRIF values, a
Fig. 3. Geographical distribution of exclusion rights across the analysed jurisdictions. The ﬁgure is compiled from the data we collected for 7 indicators. Each indicator was
assessed on a scale ranging from 0 (“right fully restricted”) to 100 (“no restrictions apply”). The exclusion rights index is the mean value of the 7 indicators. The gradient of the colour
varies from a lighter colour (low degree of freedom in decision making) to darker colours (high degree of freedom in decision making).
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principal component analysis was performed (Fig. 6). The analysis
considers the values assigned to the 37 indicators as variables and they
are grouped into the 10 sub-categories of rights (Fig. 6a). The 31 jur-
isdictions are plotted according to ﬁrst two principal components
(Comp. 1 and Comp. 2) which together explain 72% of the variance
(Fig. 6c).
The ﬁrst principal component (Comp. 1) has the highest correlation
values employing indicators relating to operational management rights
(0.64) and management planning (0.56). These indicators contribute
the most to the variation in the PRIF values amongst the jurisdictions
(Fig. 6a). Thus, the main source of variation amongst the jurisdictions is
the degree of freedom to make decisions in operational management
and the formulation of the management goals. The ﬁrst component
clearly diﬀerentiates between the former socialist countries jurisdic-
tions (left-hand quadrats) and the western jurisdictions (right-hand
quadrats). The Baltic countries diﬀer from the group of other former
socialist countries and are located in a right hand quadrat, while Veneto
and Greece are jurisdictions with westernized political backgrounds
that nevertheless appeared in the left-hand quadrats (Fig. 6c). The
second principal component (Comp. 2) has the highest correlation va-
lues with two indicators relating to forest owner’s public access exclu-
sion rights (−0.74) and the exclusion of the public use of NWFPs
(−0.60). These categories diﬀerentiate the jurisdictions in the upper
quadrat which have less exclusion rights than those in the lower
quadrat which have more exclusion rights.
The second principal component explains diﬀerences inside the
group of former socialist countries and the western jurisdictions. By
combining the two main components, diﬀerent patterns of property
rights distribution may be identiﬁed combining the private interest in
timber products and the public interest in recreation and NWFPs: in the
Nordic jurisdictions, PFOs have limited exclusion rights on forest pro-
ducts other than timber (Finland, Norway, Sweden) while the countries
located in the lower right hand quadrat have granted both management
and exclusion rights to private owners (France, the Netherlands,
Denmark). In some former-socialist countries PFOs have less rights for
timber removal but more rights to exclude public access and public
harvesting of NWFPs (Romania, Poland) while in contrast the countries
located in the upper-left hand quadrat have important restrictions in
both management and exclusion rights (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia, Greece, Slovenia).
The regional diﬀerentiation of PRIF (Table 6) shows that PFOs in
jurisdictions with enduring westernised socio-political backgrounds
have greater degrees of freedom in which to make and implement de-
cisions on their forest lands in comparison to PFOs from former socialist
countries. In westernised socio-political jurisdictions the assignment of
property rights to PFOs are signiﬁcantly greater. This has the eﬀect of
Fig. 4. Overview of the Property Right Index in Forestry (PRIF), with results per jurisdiction. The ﬁgure is compiled from the data we collected for 37 indicators, grouped into ﬁve
property rights categories (PRCs). Each indicator was assessed on a scale ranging from 0 (“right fully restricted”) to 100 (“no restrictions apply”). The property rights index is the mean of
the 37 indicators. The jurisdictions are oriented along the vertical axis and are sorted in order of increasing PRIF from the top down.
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empowering their constituent PFOs, while the rules regulating forest
owners’ actions in many former socialist jurisdictions are rather strict,
particularly for harvesting and management rights.
Looking at the regional division of countries according to FOREST
EUROPE (2015), the analysis shows that PFOs in the South-Eastern
region have the lowest degree of freedom in decision making, in com-
parison to Central-Eastern Europe (a former socialist region) which has
greater ownership rights, particularly in the category of exclusion. The
Central-Western European jurisdictions have higher scores for most of
the rights compared with North-European countries, Baltic countries
included in the latter. South-Western European countries do not appear
to adhere together in a common pattern as Veneto (Italy) has higher
restrictions on PFOs than Catalonia and Portugal.
Finally, we tested the correlation between the percentage of private
property in each of the jurisdictions and the values for the PRIF and its
constituents PRCs. The percentage of private ownership was found to be
signiﬁcantly (signiﬁcance level alpha=0.05) and positively correlated
with indicators relating to operational management (Pearson’s
r= 0.65, p= 0.0001), management planning (Pearson’s r= 0.61,
p=0.0003), withdrawal rights for timber products (Pearson’s r= 0.63,
p=0.0001) and withdrawal rights for NWFPs (Pearson’s r= 0.57,
p=0.0008). Furthermore, the PRIF correlates positively and sig-
niﬁcantly with the share of private ownership (Pearson’s r= 0.67,
coeﬃcient of determinants= 0.45, p < 0.0001), inferring that the
larger the area of private forests existing within a jurisdiction, the
higher the PRIF is, i.e. the more freedom PFOs have regarding making
decisions relating to their forests. Nevertheless, the correlations remain
signiﬁcant only for Western group of countries where a higher area of
private ownership is associated with a higher degree of freedom for
withdrawal rights, management rights and the overall PRIF (Table 6).
In former socialist countries the area of private property does not sig-
niﬁcantly correlate with any of the PRCs, thus countries with a higher
area of private forest ownership do not necessarily have higher degrees
of freedom. No correlations between PRC values and the area of private
forest ownership are displayed when jurisdictions have been grouped
according to their Forest Europe categories. When one considers that
the number of observations for each group gets smaller, it is statistically
dubious to discuss the signiﬁcance of the correlations e.g. only 3 ob-
servations in South-West Europe.
4. Discussions and conclusions
What can be learned from our assessment of PFOs’ property rights in
Europe? The most remarkable ﬁnding of this paper is the striking dif-
ferences in the degree of freedom that PFOs experience in diﬀerent
European countries and regions. Owning a forest in FYR Macedonia
obviously means something diﬀerent from owning a forest in the
Netherlands. These diﬀerences manifest themselves in a number of
diﬀerent ways ranging from the way PFOs are allowed to put forest
products on to markets, to the imposition of environmental regulations
and to the governance of forests in general. Regarding the latter, the
diversity in European forest owners’ freedom to make decisions calls for
an assessment of how international and EU policies are implemented
and how they aﬀect privately owned forests. In other words, the stat-
utory provisions at the national level may strongly shape the eﬃcacy of
higher-level policies. This has implications for multi-level policy in-
terrelationships where policy-makers and policy-programme designers
have to take account of the diﬀerences in property rights across the
Fig. 5. Geographical distribution of the Property rights index in forestry (PRIF). The scale for the PRIF is divided according to the following categories: jurisdictions with extremely
limited freedom in decision making have a PRIF between 0 and 25.0 (no observed instances in this category), jurisdictions with highly restrictive freedom in decision making have a PRIF
value between 25.1 and 50.0, jurisdictions with a moderate degree of freedom in decision making have a PRIF value between 50.1 and 75.0 and jurisdictions with higher degree of
freedom in decision making have a PRIF between 75.1 and 100.0.
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Fig. 6. Principal component analysis of the property rights distribution in forestry. The analysis considers the values identiﬁed for the 10 sub-categories of rights as variables access
rights (Access), withdrawal rights for timber (Wd_Timber), withdrawal rights for non-wood forest products (Wd_NWFPs), rights for land use change (Mgt_Land use), rights for management
planning (Mgt_Planning), rights for operational management (Mgt_Operational), exclusion of public access (Ex_PubAccess), exclusion for the use of NWFPs (Ex_NWFPs), alienation rights for
forest land (Alien_Forestland) and alienation rights for timber (Alien_Timber) (a). The diﬀerent sizes of dots in the jurisdiction dot plots relate to the percentage of private forest property in
the respective jurisdictions, while the diﬀerent colours are assigned to the ﬁve country groups (FOREST EUROPE, 2015) (b). The ﬁrst factor (Comp. 1) is the freedom to make decisions in
operational management and to formulate management goals and tends to increase from left to right, while the second factor (Comp. 2) depicts the owners’ freedom to restrict public access and
to restrict withdrawal of NWFPs which decreases upwards (c).
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regions where policies are supposed to operate.
For example, the remarkable diﬀerences in forest owners’ property
rights will have important impacts on the implementation of interna-
tional policies relating to timber legality (Leipold et al., 2016). The
analysis shows that certain management practices in European private
forestry may be considered as responsible forest management in one
jurisdiction, while in other jurisdictions they may appear to infringe
laws. Thus, with respect to legal compliance in the timber trade across
European countries, due regard must be given to existing regulatory
frameworks when assessing whether PFOs from one jurisdiction are
more liable to introduce illegal timber into EU timber markets than
another jurisdiction. Furthermore, if a particular jurisdiction’s laws
such that PFOs in that jurisdiction may face higher burdens to comply
with diﬀerent international legal requirements, it may create diﬃcul-
ties in gaining access to international markets in comparison to PFOs
from other jurisdictions.
The analysis shows that each jurisdiction in the analysis has a dif-
ferent approach to regulating the interplay between the private and the
public use of forest ecosystem services. The results of the principal
component analysis (Fig. 6) and the regional comparative analysis
(Table 6) provide insights into the relationship between the PRCs, il-
lustrating some interesting PRIF patterns amongst in the relationship
between the private owner’s interest in timber products and the public’s
interest in recreation and NWFPs. The beneﬁt of PRIF is to deconstruct
the content of the property rights metric into its components, making it
possible to identify from which PRC or constituent indicator the re-
strictions or freedoms originate. Some rights are deﬁned at the con-
stitutional level (access and exclusion rights are usually regulated by
civil code or a primary forest act) and thus may have strong political
and cultural provenance and consistency. Other rights like the quantity
of timber that can be withdrawn or rules for mushroom collection tend
to be grounded in technical or scientiﬁc norms and by-laws. Diverse
regulations may even exist in a country in respect to the harvesting of
speciﬁc NWFPs’ e.g. in Portugal cork and cork oak stands are highly
regulated and private forest owners have strict limitations in terms cork
harvesting while mushrooms collection is at owners’ discretion.
A major implication of the identiﬁed variation in property rights is
that the formulation of a common EU forest policy may be fraught with
diﬃculties. As shown by our analysis, the restrictions on operational
and management rights present a clear diﬀerentiation between the
participant jurisdictions. More speciﬁcally, the process of management
planning seems to be crucial in both increasing and constraining the
degree of freedom for PFOs as FMPs tend to be considered as “key in-
struments in delivering multiple goods and services in a balanced way”
(European Comission, 2013). Yet the nature of FMPs as instruments
varies considerably across Europe from a hierarchical implementation
of governmental designed technical norms (Bouriaud et al., 2013;
Brukas and Sallnäs, 2012; Lawrence, 2007) to a space for negotiation or
learning between the State and its constituent forest owners (Mermet
and Farcy, 2011) routed in the “freedom with responsibility” principle
(Löfmarck et al., 2017).
The PRIF focuses on de jure governance. However, while regulatory
instruments set permissible regimes and thresholds, these may not co-
incide with actual practices; a rigid regulatory framework may even be
correlated with a rather lax implementation of laws (Sotirov et al.,
2015). Furthermore, the implementation of regulations is often open to
interpretation. Thus, a jurisdiction’s PRIF may diﬀer from the actual
degree of freedom a PFO may experience. For example, forest owners
may be legally entitled to totally forbid public access into their forests
but it may rarely or never be strictly applied (Vedel et al., 2015) or even
feasible in practice. To overcome this intrinsic limitation of the PRIF, it
would be highly interesting to compliment the research carried out in
this paper with research into the de facto degree of freedom perceived
by PFOs across Europe, and how both translate into management
practices of Europe’s privately owned forests.
The fact that PRIF only reﬂects the distribution of rights as
determined by the “formal laws” makes the index insensitive to re-
strictions in property rights that may arise from non-state, market-
driven governance structures, or cultural-historical institutions and
norms. For example, in the countries where forest management plans
are not compulsory, sustainable management practices are documented
by forest certiﬁcation schemes. The certiﬁcation bodies deﬁne new
standards or “soft laws”, in the form of contractual and sanction based
agreements that may in actuality be more coercive than oﬃcial legal
rules. Of course, forest owners are free to adhere or not to these certi-
ﬁcations schemes. However, adhesion is often implicitly unavoidable if
market access for forest derived goods and services are to be secured.
This new trend in rights and regulations is sometimes interpreted as a
privatization of forestry governance (Cashore et al., 2005; Pattberg,
2005) or as a substitute for deﬁcient forest authorities (Contreras-
Hermosilla and Peter, 2006). A similar approach is brought to the fore
by the use of economic instruments such as subsidies or grants to direct
the forest owners to certain policy outcomes. In such cases the degree of
freedom in property rights may be renegotiated and sometimes even
limited by the ﬁnancing bodies, and because of this limitation PFOs in
Europe may approach subsidies with caution (Church and Ravenscroft,
2008).
A signiﬁcant advantage oﬀered by the use of the PRIF index is the
structured overview it provides, revealing substantial diﬀerences in
terms of how legal frameworks shape the PFO’s property rights. As
compared with other indices on property rights e.g. the International
Property Rights Index (Levy-Carciente, 2016) and the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation, 2017) that aggregate var-
ious sources of data into a single overarching concept (Ginsburg, 2011;
Voigt, 2013), the PRIF’s construction is highly focused: the bundle of
rights is made up of ﬁve constituent PRCs which are in turn made up of
37 indicators). The PRIF is also one-dimensional in character (Rossiter,
2010) measuring the level of restriction for each indicator.
The PRIF represents a real methodological advance, in that the
answers for each indicator are grounded in the provisions of law. Expert
judgements are used for the selection of appropriate indicators and for
the interpretation of the rigorousness of the law when assessing the
level of restriction for each indicator. Thus, PRIF aims at presenting an
“objective evidence” of statutes, while the interpretative nature of de-
ﬁning freedom levels for each situation is acknowledged and mitigated
with robust, transparent, and iterative procedure. The methodology
behind PRIF can complement the construction of barometer-type in-
dices, employed to measure institutions, which are built on expert or
stakeholder perceptions only, and thus may lack speciﬁcity and trans-
parency (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017).
This structured overview, combined with the realities of de facto
rights and “soft laws” such as certiﬁcation, provides a solid grounding
for future research. Despite the fact that the current application of PRIF
is restricted to private forest ownership, the indicators can be re-deﬁned
and re-categorised using a similar methodology to carry out analyses of
other forms of ownership and other land uses. The PRIF can be em-
ployed both to assess regional diﬀerences at sub-national level or at a
larger international scale and to track the historical development of
institutional decisions. It also can be employed to establish a bench
mark of jurisdictions by correlating the values of PRCs and PRIF with
relevant economic, environmental and social indicators characterizing
forest management (Winkel et al., 2009). Finally, it also oﬀers plenty of
scope for the identiﬁcation of drivers behind the variation between
these jurisdictions, based, inter alia on historic discourses and path
dependencies (Pukall and Dobler, 2015), discursive-institutional ana-
lysis (Arts and Buizer, 2009) and entreprenerial property rights changes
(Nichiforel and Schanz, 2011).
Future comparative analyses using the PRIF index may focus on
private forests that are managed under diﬀerent nature conservation
regimes (e.g. National Parks, Natura 2000 sites etc.). Additional in-
dicators, arising from environmental and nature conservation legisla-
tion, may be added to reﬂect the rights and duties of regulatory bodies
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and owners with regard to forest ecosystem services such as water
quantity, water quality, soil erosion and carbon sequestration. These
issues could be integrated into an index and make the argument for
ecosystem services payments to forest owners (Zhang, 2016). While
these additional indicators are outside the scope of this paper, this study
has highlighted the potential for their inclusion in the construction of
new indices that have a diﬀerent focus.
Concluding, it is important to note that the PRIF index is not de-
signed to derive normative assumptions about jurisdictions depending
on whether they have higher or lower scores. The degree of freedom in
each jurisdiction has to be interpreted within a larger set of formal and
informal institutional settings. Thus, the use of the index oﬀers the
possibility to contextualise the relationship between the governed in-
dividuals (forest owners), the mechanisms of governance and the de-
sired policy outcomes. Empirical insights as those presented here will
safeguard policy and decision makers against erroneous assumptions
about the variation in property rights distribution when assessing the
opportunities for vertical and horizontal integration of forest and en-
vironmental policies.
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